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The Expanding Importance of Temporary
Physical Takings: Some Unresolved Issues
and an Opportunity for New Directions in
Takings Law
DENNIS H. LONG*
"Most people know a taking when they see one, or at least they think they do."'
INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution neither enlarges nor
restricts the powers of government. It does, however, under certain
circumstances, require that compensation be paid to owners when governments
seize or physically occupy property, or when they institute laws or regulations
which substantially interfere with full use or economic benefit from property.
Recent contradictory decisions reached by lower federal courts in the area of
temporary physical takings law have highlighted a major area of uncertainty and
ambiguity in takings jurisprudence. Historically, temporary physical takings have
played a minor role in comparison to the much more numerous and more
controversial cases involving permanent physical takings and regulatory takings.
For reasons based more on historical evolution than on logic or legal theory,
takings law has developed into two distinct branches which resolve seemingly
similar cases using very different legal rules and judicial tests. In the more
ancient branch, permanent seizure or permanent physical occupation of land by
government is treated as a per se taking and must be compensated no matter how
slight the deprivation, no matter how small the economic harm, and no matter
how important the public benefit of the government action. In contrast, when the
alleged taking consists of a limitation on use of property resulting from a statute
or regulation without physical entry, the rules are much different. Here, the
courts engage in a very detailed and fact-sensitive balancing process to determine
whether or not a taking2 has occurred. In this balancing procedure, courts
compare the nature of the government action, its benefits to society, the
economic impact on the landowner, and even the reasonable expectations of the
landowner to profit from and enjoy the use of her land. In practice, courts have
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S.
(Distinguished), 1968, Virginia Military Institute; M.S. (With Distinction), 1972, United States
Naval Postgraduate School. Special appreciation is extended to Professor Fred H. Cate for
imparting a firm basis in property law and for invaluable guidance and criticism in the
preparation of this Note.
1. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (2d ed. 1988).
2. In accordance with common usage, the word "deprivation" will be used in this Note to
describe any injury to property caused by any level of government. The word "taking" will be
used to describe only those deprivations which actually violate the Takings Clause and must
be compensated. A deprivation becomes a taking whenever a court recognizes it as such. A
"taking claim" is a claim that a deprivation is, in fact, a taking.
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been very pro-property owner in permanent physical takings cases, but very
deferential to government in regulatory takings cases.
Lying between these two main branches is the separate, less well-defined, and
heretofore insignificant category of temporary physical takings. The Supreme
Court has provided limited guidance, in dicta, for dealing with cases in this area.
Although the government action is of the same nature as permanent physical
takings, the Court has ruled that the balancing tests developed for regulatory
takings will be applied to the temporary physical category.
The major unresolved issue facing the federal courts, however, is the definition
of "temporary" (in the sense of a defining or threshold duration) in the physical
takings context. When this definition is eventually formulated it will determine
whether the per se rule or the balancing rule will be applied to a potentially large
number of future takings claims. The result could be of very significant impact
not only to the rights of property owners but to the ability of budget-limited
governments to meet public needs especially in the areas of environmental
monitoring, inspection, and remediation. Moreover, the current issue provokes
a wide-ranging and thoughtful reexamination of the utility and desirability of
continuing the dual takings law structure itself.
This Note will focus on the development of temporary physical takings law and
the nature of the related current issues facing the federal courts. Part I
summarizes the historical development of the dual structure of takings
jurisprudence from the adoption of the Bill of Rights to the present day. Part II
focuses on the development of the temporary physical takings subcategory. Part
III describes the background, procedural history, and holding of the Federal
Court of Claims in Preseault v. United States ("Preseault 2"),' in which
temporary physical takings were defined to include deprivations of up to thirty
years duration. Part IV describes the Federal Circuit's contrasting holding in
Hendler v. United States4 in which only tiansient and inconsequential physical
deprivations were considered to be temporary. Part V compares the merits of the
two holdings on the bases of precedent and public policy. Part VI addresses the
wider implications of the Preseault-Hendler contrast for the future development
of takings law.
I. THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF TAKINGS LAW
All takings law and adjudication is based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution which reads, in pertinent part, "nor
3.27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992), rev'd, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Preseaults' action
in the federal courts has resulted in five separate reported opinions from 1988 to the present.
This Note will adopt the convention of the Federal Circuit, 100 F.3d 1525, 1530 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1996), for short form reference to each of these opinions by chronologically applying Arabic
numerals to the trial court opinions and Roman numerals to the appellate opinions: Preseault
v. I.C.C., 853 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Preseault P"); Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1 (1990)
("Preseault I/f); Preseault v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 818 (1992) ("Preseault 1"); Preseault
v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992) ("Preseault 2"); Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d
1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Preseault 11f').
4. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."5 The
Clause reflected a strong respect for the sanctity of property rights among the
revolutionary generation.' This respect for property was one of the few matters
upon which the various political factions of that era seemed to agree.7 One
faction, the Lockean liberals, typified by James Madison, saw the protection of
private property as a bulwark to protect each individual's intrinsic liberties from
the intrusion of state power.' At the same time, the civic republicans, such as
Thomas Jefferson, supported property rights for different reasons. They were
less concerned with individual rights but felt every citizen should securely hold
property as a stake or share in society, which would promote active and
"virtuous" participation in government.9 Jefferson specifically saw property as
protecting citizens from dependence on government. As one commentator
described Jefferson's viewpoint, "[w]ithout having property and a will of his
own-without having independence-a man could have no public spirit; and
there could be no republic."'" Thus many of the Founders, for differing reasons,
saw the wisdom of including in the Bill of Rights a clause restraining the
government's ability to seize a citizen's property.
The authors and adopters of the Takings Clause probably had in mind only one
type of taking: the formal exercise of the power of eminent domain by
government to take land for public projects. As a legal issue, the Clause
received very little attention for over eighty years. There were relatively few
federal projects' 2 and the Clause was not considered applicable to the states until
1896." As importantly, there were few disputes surrounding the projects which
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 55 (1992).
7. Id.
8. ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA 263-64 (1990).
9. Id. at 267-68.
10. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 19 (1992).
11. ELY, supra note 6, at 55. The immediate motivation for including the Clause in the Bill
of Rights may have included dissatisfaction with the practice of some states of taking land
without compensation for road projects.
Perhaps still more surprising is that the principle that the state should
compensate individuals for property taken for public use was not widely
established in America at the time of the Revolution. Only colonial Massachusetts
seems rigidly to have followed the principle of just compensation in
roadbuilding .... Despite the efforts of Thomas Jefferson to establish the
principle... in postrevolutionary Virginia, no law providing compensation for
land ... was enacted until 1785 .... Of the first postrevolutionary state
constitutions, only those of Vermont and Massachusetts contained provisions
requiring compensation.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 63-64 (1992).
12. ELY, supra note 6, at 76.
13. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 589 n.3 (citing Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896)).
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did exist because the principle of just compensation in the exercise of eminent
domain was universally accepted and observed. 4
A. Physical Takings
The first major expansion of takings law occurred in 1871 in Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co. 5 In Pumpelly, the state government of Wisconsin had constructed
a dam which was not on Pumpelly's property but which caused his land to be
permanently flooded. The Court ruled that the Takings Clause of the Wisconsin
State Constitution (which was virtually identical to the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution) demanded just compensation for such a permanent
physical deprivation, even though the government did not take title to the
property under the power of eminent domain. 6 This decision marks the true
beginning of the physical takings branch of the dual structure.17 For the first time
government was held to have taken property by action distinct from formal
exercise of eminent domain. The rule laid down was that such a permanent
occupation was a per se taking requiring compensation no matter how great the
public benefit. 2
From Pumpelly forward the Court has held steadfastly to the rule that a
permanent physical occupation by government is a per se taking and requires
compensation to the owner without further inquiry. The Court's adherence to this
rule has been summarized by Professor Michelman in these words:
The modem significance of physical occupation is that courts, while they
sometimes do hold nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny
compensation for a physical takeover. The one incontestable case for
compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the
government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large,
"regularly" use, or "permanently" occupy, space or a thing which theretofore
was understood to be under private ownership."
The modern paradigm case of permanent physical takings is the 1982 Supreme
Court decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. 20 In Loretto,
the City of New York enacted an ordinance requiring apartment building owners
to allow installation of cable television lines in return for a payment of one dollar
per apartment. Loretto, an apartment landlord, claimed a physical taking. The
Court agreed that the city had committed a permanent physical taking, despite the
fact that the entire space occupied was less than one and one-half cubic feet and
14. ELY, supra note 6, at 76.
15. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
16. Id. at 176-77.
17. Although Pumpelly concerned a case arising under a state constitution, the ruling was
treated as a precedent applying to the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution because of the
similarity of wording.
18. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181.
19. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1967) (emphasis
in original).
20. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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despite the fact that there was no showing of economic harm. 2' The Court's
support of property rights against permanent physical deprivation is virtually
absolute, and Loretto continues to enjoy support by the Court. Most recently
Justice Scalia, writing in the 1992 opinion Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,' cited Loretto as the primary authority in support of the proposition that
"[i]n general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute
the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have
required compensation. 23
B. Regulatory Takings
This absolute application of the per se rule contrasts sharply with the Court's
treatment of regulatory takings. The very idea of taking as a result of regulation
(without actual physical entry) took many years to develop. In the thinly
populated and rural early America, statutes (and particularly federal statutes) had
little power to affect the value or free use of land.24 Two developments caused
that insulation to change. The first was-the recognition by the Court that the
Takings Clause applied to state and local governments as a result of the
Fourteenth Amendment.25 Indeed, the majority of landmark takings decisions
since 1900 have arisen from state and local, rather than federal, actions. The
second more gradual development was urbanization and the related increase in
population density. Local governments and their citizens, concerned about wise
land use and the segregation of noxious nuisances from residential
neighborhoods, developed the technique of zoning.26 It was in this zoning context
that the first takings claims were raised which involved regulations rather than
physical intrusion.27 However, the Court did not consider zoning to be a taking
even when the result was a loss in value to property owners. The Court chose to
see zoning, in most instances, as a mutual benefit to all including the supposedly
injured property owner.2
In 1922, however, the Court had recognized that a regulation or statute,
without physical invasion, can indeed work a taking. In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,29 the State of Pennsylvania had passed a law which prohibited coal
companies from removing the coal beneath land which contained homes or public
buildings even when the coal company owned the mineral estate?' The
prohibition applied even when the owner of the surface estate had purchased with
21. a1d at 434-38.
22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
23. Id. at 1015.
24. ELY, supra note 6, at 91.
25. Id.
26. Id at 112.
27. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding a
comprehensive zoning ordinance separating commercial, industrial, and residential uses into
prescribed districts not to be a taking); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (holding
constitutional a Boston, Massachusetts statute limiting height of buildings).
28. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
30. Id. at 412-13.
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notice that the surface was subject to destruction through mining?' The coal
company's claim of a taking was rejected by the district court and the court of
appeals, but was accepted by the Supreme Court. Justice Holmes, writing for the
majority, held that, "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."32 By far, the principal effort in takings jurisprudence since Mahon has
been to define what it means for a regulation to go "too far."
For the most part, the Supreme Court retreated from the regulatory takings fray
for the next fifty years, leaving the field to the state courts.33 The Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,34
however, signaled renewed activity of the Supreme Court in the takings arena.35
Penn Central, the owner of Grand Central Station in New York City, planned to
build a fifty-three story office building above the station while leaving the station
itself intact and unaltered. When Penn Central sought city approval it was denied.
The denial was not based on zoning ordinances, but on a statute permitting the
city to preserve the character of historic structures. Penn Central claimed a
regulatory taking, but the Court disagreed. Justice Brennan, writing for a
majority of six Justices, formulated in this opinion the three-pronged Penn
Central test for determining when a regulation crosses Justice Holmes's line of
"too far." Under this test the Court focuses on three areas of factual inquiry: (1)
the character of the governmental action, (2) the economic impact of the action
on the claimant, and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the
claimant's distinct investment-backed expectations.36
In practice the test has become a framework for judicial balancing which has
been very deferential to governments.37 This deferential tone was set by Penn
Central itself. In refusing to find a taking in New York's action, the Court ruled
(1) that the historic landmark ordinance as a governmental action was analogous
to zoning as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power, (2) that the denial
31. Id. at 412.
32. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
33. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also James W. Ely,
Jr., A Breather on the Takings Clause, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 42, 44.
34. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
35. Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1372.
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The first factor, "character of the government action,"
has been described as follows:
When the Court considers the "character" of the law which is affecting the
private property interest, it is usually considering the justification for the law. If
the law is not meant to merely bring about a private benefit, but instead is
designed to fuirther a broader public purpose, it is more likely to be upheld [as not
working a taking]. Two kinds of public purposes tend to immunize regulatory
laws from takings challenges. First, government actions [which] are intended to
regulate the "nuisance-like" qualities of prohibited conduct. Second, government
actions [which] despite their impact on property rights.. . "arise from a public
program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."
Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U. TOL. L.
REv. 281,296 (1993) (citation omitted).
37. ELY, supra note 6, at 146-47.
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did not entail significant economic impact because Penn Central was still able to
profit from the existing facility, and (3) that the denial did not violate Penn
Central's legitimate expectations for a reasonable return on its investment.38
The Penn Central test remains the prescribed rule for adjudicating regulatory
takings claims, most recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lucas.39
C. The Branches Compared
Together the Supreme Court's decisions in Loretto and Penn Central superbly
illuminate the inconsistencies and contradictions of present-day takings law. Two
New York City property owners challenged two New York City ordinances under
the Takings Clause. Loretto, who suffered a minute physical intrusion but
demonstrated no economic loss, received the full support and protection of the
Constitution and was compensated. Penn Central, which sustained no actual
intrusion but suffered a presumably large economic loss, received no
compensation at all and was essentially told that the sacrifice was the cost of
living in an ordered society.
Such a contrasting and contradictory system is not easy to justify. It has
developed and continues to exist for a number of complexly related historical,
economic, and practical reasons. The Loretto branch traces its lineage to the early
days of the nation when all the political theories agreed that private property was
a good in itself which government should protect.4" So long as takings law only
dealt with eminent domain and permanent physical occupation, the per se rule
was probably supportable because it reinforced popular conceptions of property
and was financially manageable for government.
However, as the nation urbanized and expanded, government grew to affect
property and its economic value more frequently and more directly through
regulation than by physical takings. The traditional sense of the sanctity of
private property urged that takings rules should be expanded to require
compensation here as well. But there were very serious practical problems in
compensating for regulatory takings. To require such compensation was to risk
the paralysis of government.
This risk of paralysis arises from the fact that virtually all statutes and
regulations benefit some citizens and deprive others. Not all such deprivations
can be compensated. The cost of the compensation and the cost of administering
the compensation system could become prohibitive. To make matters worse the
liability of government would be unpredictable and unlimited. Only after
legislation was enacted and the takings claims filed would government know how
much it owed in compensation. As a result, governments faced with large and
unpredictable compensation liability would be induced to timidly avoid
legislating."
To avoid this result a method was needed which would compensate the truly
deserving cases of regulatory deprivation but weed out those which were merely
38. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-38.
39. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20 n.8 (1992).
40. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
41. See BRUCEA. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTON 148-49 (1977).
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the normal cost of living in an ordered society. This is the problem which Justice
Holmes was seeking to solve in laying down the "too far" standard of Mahon42
and which Justice Brennan was seeking to structure with the balancing test in
Penn Central.43
While the balancing approach became accepted in regulatory cases, it has not
been extended to permanent physical takings. It is true that in at least two
physical takings cases arising at the end of the decade of the 1970s, the Court
discussed the balancing issues of the Penn Central test in reaching decisions.44
At that time, there may have been cause to expect the demise of the per se rule.
However, those expectations were extinguished by Loretto, which firmly
established the traditional rule.4" It is possible to engage in conjecture concerning
the Court's reluctance to abandon the per se rule. Abandoning the rule would
inevitably be seen as degrading the strength of the Takings Clause and a
reduction in the force of property rights in general. In contrast, establishing the
balancing approach for regulatory takings did not run the same risk because such
claims had never before been recognized prior to Mahon. The Court's reluctance
may also stem from the fact that in all of the evolving history of takings law,
every change has favored property owners. Replacing the per se rule with a
balancing test would be the first change made by the Supreme Court to favor
government deprivation. The Court is probably unwilling to make such a change,
and that reluctance has insured the continuance of the dual structure.
D. The Continued Acceptance of the Dual Structure
As if to dispel any suspicion that the dual structure is withering, the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to restate its general support of both branches in 1992
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.46 In Lucas, Justice Scalia, writing
for a divided Court, not only confirmed the dual structure but added a bridge
between the two. That bridge consisted of a new rule that a regulatory
deprivation would be treated as a per se taking in the extreme case in which a
regulation destroyed one hundred percent of the economic value of land. 47 Lucas
is not only significant as a ratification of the dual structure, but as an indicator
that the Court (as then constituted) supported minor expansion (rather than
narrowing) of the per se branch.
What has evolved, then, is a structure with two distinct branches which purport
to protect the same right but which do so using tests which share virtually no
common or consistent definitions or rules.48 The two branches owe more to the
42. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
43. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 595-96.
44. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
45. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438-39, 441 (1982).
46. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
47. Id. at 1027.
48. For a current comprehensive summary of the state of takings law see David S. Favre,
A Frameworkfor Analysis of the "Takings" Issue, 1995 DET. C.L. REv. 3.
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eras of their historical origin than to legal principle. However, recent
developments in the area of temporary physical takings may provide an
opportunity or a requirement for the courts to reexamine and begin a
modification of this structure.
II. TEMPORARY PHYSICAL TAKINGS
The dual structure described in Part I establishes two principal categories of
takings: regulatory (non-physical) takings and permanent physical takings. This
leaves the logical implication that there may be a third category: temporary
physical takings. This third category has been recognized to exist but it has
received far less attention and has suffered from inconsistent and contradictory
treatment from the federal courts. There are considerable grounds for confusion
over the definitions of this category and its appropriate rules of adjudication.49
The history and development of temporary physical takings is difficult to trace.
The earliest physical occupation case, Pumpelly, limited its ruling to permanent
physical occupation. In subsequent flooding cases the Court found takings to
exist only where the frequency and persistence of inundation became
constructively permanent." These cases appeared to assume that a physical
deprivation which was not permanent was, for that reason, not a taking."'
The first favorable consideration of apparently-temporary 52 physical takings
may be traced to a line of cases in which the War Department seized warehouses
and factories during World War 1I.3 The power to effect the seizures was not
questioned, rather the issue was the amount of compensation due the owners. In
each of these decisions the Supreme Court ruled that the amount of compensation
was to be determined based on the Takings Clause. In one of these seizure
opinions, the Court reasoned that although the deprivation was not perpetual, it
was nonetheless permanent and subject to the per se rule.54 In the eyes of the
Court, the government had in effect permanently taken an "estate or tenancy for
years[]""5 from the owners. These seizure decisions seemed to establish that
some, if not all, apparently-temporary physical takings are in fact compensable
under the per se rule. It remained (and still remains) unclear, however, whether
there is some threshold of duration below which the deprivation ceased to be
49. One of the leading treatises on eminent domain and takings devotes a section of eight
pages to the subject of temporary physical takings. It acknowledges they exist and provides
examples but does not define "temporary" or describe judicial rules or tests, saying "It]he
variety of factual situations in temporary takings cases does not allow formulation of a single
standard or readily identifiable set of rules." 2A JuLius L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 6.05[3] (rev. 3d ed. 1995).
50. E.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
51. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
52. The term "apparently-temporary" will be used here to describe deprivations and takings
offinite duration. As will be seen, some courts consider some takings and deprivations of finite
duration to be nonetheless permanent.
53. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor
Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
54. See General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378.
55. Id. (quoting general legal usage or terminology).
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permanent and became temporary. The shortest period of seizure adjudged to be
a taking in these cases was twelve months. 6
A precedent for an even shorter duration per se taking was established in
another wartime seizure case, United States v. Pewee Coal Co.," in which the
Court found a per se taking, when the federal government seized a coal mine for
a period of five and one-half months. Together these cases appear to establish
that apparently-temporary deprivations as brief as the Pewee Coal seizure receive
the same per se treatment as permanent occupations.
However, no explicit statement of the law of temporary physical takings
appeared until the Supreme Court's 1982 opinion in Loretto. This statement is
at least partially dicta since Loretto was decided as a per se permanent physical
taking. However, the Loretto Court devoted several pages of the opinion to
considering and overcoming the government's argument that the cable
installation was not a permanent intrusion."
Loretto does not use the term "temporary physical taking" but rather refers to
"physical invasions," which it distinguishes from "physical occupations." The
latter are classic per se physical takings. Physical invasions appear to include an
assortment of deprivations which include temporary physical deprivation as well
as intermittent physical deprivations. 9 No definition of "temporary" is provided
and the issue of duration is not addressed.
In the most significant passage of this section of Loretto, the Court, somewhat
surprisingly, declares that all (temporary) physical invasions (as distinct from
(permanent) physical occupations) are to be subjected not to the per se test but
rather to the Penn Central balancing test." This single judicial pronouncement
is a principal source of the current uncertainty in the temporary physical takings
jurisprudence.
To say the least, Loretto is difficult to interpret with respect to the law of
temporary physical takings. If the application of the Penn Central test applies to
all apparently-temporary deprivations of any finite duration, then Loretto must
overrule the War Department seizure cases and Pewee Coal without explicitly
declaring to do so. Such an overruling seems to be very unlikely since the Loretto
Court cites Pewee Coal as instructive with respect to another issue in the case
and even notes that the taking in Pewee Coal was of finite duration.6
Alternatively, the Court in Loretto may be recognizing the seizure case holdings
and prescribing the balancing test for a class of temporary takings claims in
which the duration is less than some as yet unspecified threshold. The actual
meaning remains uncertain.
The Loretto doctrine with respect to temporary physical takings has been of
little practical effect and has figured in no federal appellate decisions until quite
recently. However, a 1992 decision of the U.S. Federal Court of Claims
(subsequently reversed on other grounds by the Federal Circuit) suggests that the
56. Id. at 376.
57. 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
58. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428-35 (1982).
59. Id. at 432-35.
60. Id. at435 n.12.
61. Id. at 431.
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Loretto doctrine and the category of temporary physical takings may become
more prominent features of the takings landscape.
III. PRESEAULT
Preseault v. United States"' is one of many cases in the last decade challenging
the "Rails to Trails" program, in which the federal government has promoted the
use of unused railroad routes as recreational trails as part of a policy of
preserving the right-of-way network for a future restoration of the national rail
system.63 The Preseaults, who were typical of the claimants in many similar
cases, are owners of land in Vermont through which a railroad owned a
long-standing easement for its tracks.' As part of the decline of the rail industry,
the owning rail company ceased to run trains over the Preseaults' property in
1970 and removed all of its equipment and rails in 1975. Under Vermont
property law, this action by the railroad constituted abandonment and should
have effected a reversion of the easement to the Preseaults.65 The Preseaults
presumably believed they had regained ownership of their property
unencumbered by the prior easement. However, they were to learn that federal
statutes had preempted Vermont property law. Ten years later in 1985, the
federal Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") authorized the lease of the
easement as a hiking trail to a neighboring town.66 This action by the ICC was
within its power under a combination of two federal statutes.67
62. 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992), rev'd, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For the numbering
convention applied to the various Preseault opinions, see supra note 3.
63. See Fritsch v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 59 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Goos v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1990); Vieux v. East Bay Reg'l Park
Dist., 906 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1990); Schneider v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 120 (D.
Neb. 1994); Dave v. Rails to Trails Conservancy, 863 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Wash. 1994). The
overall Preseault claim is the first of the challenges to recreational transfers to state a taking
claim. Other challenges have been based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution or
on interpretation of statutes.
64. The easement was acquired by the original owner railroad in 1899. It was transferred
to the State of Vermont which leased it to a successor railroad in 1964. It was the successor
railroad which ceased to use the easement. Preseault 2, 27 Fed. Cl. at 73-75, 87.
65. Preseault 1, 24 Cl. Ct. 818, 833 (1992). In this somewhat curious opinion the United
States Claims Court (later redesignated the Federal Court of Claims) rendered an opinion on
the Preseaults' takings claim under the assumption that federal statutes had not preempted
Vermont property law. Id at 832 n.6. Under this artificial assumption the court concluded that
the easement had reverted when the railroad company removed its equipment and that the
transfer to trail use was a physical taking. See id. at 832-33. The same court then reheard the
case considering the full effect of federal law and found no taking. Preseault 2, 27 Fed. Cl. at
71.
66. Preseault 2, 27 Fed. Cl. at 75-8 1.
67. Transportation Act of 1920, § 402, 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (1994) (prohibiting
abandonment or discontinuance of service over any rail route without permission of the ICC);
National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, § 8(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994)
(permitting the Secretary of Transportation to allow lease of rail bank easements to recreational
trail operators rather than allowing reversion to owners of servient estates).
For a full explanation of the legal and regulatory procedures implementing the abandonment
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The Preseaults unsuccessfully appealed the decision in ICC administrative
channels and then appealed directly to the United States Court of Appeals on
grounds which included a claim for an uncompensated permanent physical
taking. The case reached the Supreme Court but was remanded on ripeness
grounds without decision. The Court held that a taking complaint could not be
heard until a claim for compensation under the Tucker Act68 had been submitted
to and adjudicated by the Federal Court of Claims. 9 The Preseaults then filed
such a claim.
It is the resulting ruling of the Federal Court of Claims in Preseault 270 which
poses the possibility that temporary physical takings may become a much more
prominent arena of takings law, with far ranging impact on government at every
level. The court first ruled that the deprivation was a "physical occupation."'"
Had the court then foll6wed the War Department seizure cases and Pewee Coal,
the case would have been decided as a per se taking of a term of years estate.
However, the court followed different reasoning and ruled that the deprivation
was temporary and not permanent because federal statutes limited the trail lease
to a maximum of thirty years!2 The impact of this characterization, based on the
dicta of Loretto, was to take the case out of the per se takings branch and place
it under the Penn Central balancing test instead."
Not unexpectedly, the court then found no taking on the grounds that the
Preseaults purchased the land after the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976'4 was enacted. Since this statute gave the ICC the power to
deny abandonment and transfer easements to trail operators, the court reasoned
that the Preseaults had no reasonable investment-backed expectations of
reversion of the easement and thus failed one of the three prongs of the Penn
Central test.75
Preseault 2 overflows with legal issues, but the one of most significance here
is the ruling that a thirty year deprivation is temporary. The impact of this ruling,
had it been upheld on appeal, would have been to defeat all "Rails to Trails"
takings claims for owners who purchased after 1976. And even for owners
holding their property prior to 1976, takings claims would have enjoyed
questionable prospects for success under the deferential Penn Central balancing
test.
of rail rights of way and their transfer to recreational trail operators see National Ass'n of
Reversionary Property Owners v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, No. 94-1581, 1995 WL
687741 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1995).
68. 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) (1994) (giving to the Federal Court of Claims jurisdiction over
all claims founded upon the Constitution).
69. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1990).
70.27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992), rev'd, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
71. Id. at 95 ("The character of the government action would be a physical occupation
authorized by federal law .... ") (emphasis added).
72. Id By the terms of the federal statute, the lease was for an initial term of five years, with
an option to renew for additional five year increments for a total duration not to exceed 30
years. Id.
73. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982).
74. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 810, 90 Stat. 146 (1976) (repealed 1978).
75. Preseault 2, 27 Fed. Cl. at 95.
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However, the potential impact of the creation of a large category of temporary
deprivations goes far beyond the "Rails to Trails" claims. More dramatic effects
would be seen if governments at any level were to exploit the Preseault 2
doctrine to take property without compensation. It is not difficult to envision that
budget-strapped cities, counties, states, and even the federal government could
be tempted to circumvent eminent domain by appropriating property under a
pretense that deprivation is for only a fixed term of years. This would not be a
difficult pretense to claim and even to believe when the Preseault doctrine allows
a thirty year deprivation to be temporary. Of course, the Penn Central test
remains as a safeguard, but one which has proven in practice to be weighted in
favor of governments.76
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit's action (Preseault III) on the Preseault's
appeal of the Federal Court of Claims decision (Preseault 2) did little to clarify
the uncertainty surrounding temporary physical takings 7 After vacating its
initial panel decision affirming the Preseault 2 judgment," the Federal Circuit
reheard the appeal en banc and then consumed almost a year in preparing its
opinion, which reversed the lower court and found a compensable taking.79
Preseault III is disappointing in that it apparently ignores the temporary physical
taking issue altogether. The opinion simply presumes that per se takings analysis
applies and proceeds to find a compensible taking. No reference is made at all to
the lower court's assumption that the deprivation was temporary and that the
Penn Central test was appropriate. As a result, it is impossible to tell whether per
se analysis was applied (1) because the deprivation of the Preseault's interest was
too long to be considered temporary, or (2) because all physical deprivations,
however brief, are to be treated as per se takings. If the first alternative is the
correct one, then the question, "What is temporary?" still, significantly, awaits
an answer.
However, even if Preseault I1 had been more explicit, it would still have left
this area of the law in great uncertainty, because the court provides no majority
opinion with its decision. Only four of the nine judges hearing the case joined the
plurality opinion recognizing a compensible taking.!' Two others joined in a
separate concurrence which also ignored the temporary takings issue raised by
the court below."' The three remaining judges joined in a strongly worded
dissent, which also ignored the temporary physical takings issue, and rejected the
takings claim based on an analysis of the interaction of the federal statutes with
Vermont property law. 2
As a result of this missed opportunity, the principal questions surrounding
temporary physical takings law remain in doubt. How long must a temporary
physical deprivation go on to become permanent? What rule is applied to
76. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
77. Preseault Ifl, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
78. Preseault v. United States, 66 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated en banc, 100 F.3d
1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
79. Preseault III, 100 F.3d at 1552.
80. Id. at 1528, 1529-52.
81. Id, at 1552-54.
82. Id. at 1554-76.
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determine if a temporary physical deprivation is a taking? The only firm
conclusion from Preseault II1 is that a thirty year physical deprivation is a per se
taking. Otherwise, the Federal Court of Claims' Preseault 2 theory stands
unrejected and an apparent contender for acceptance as the standard rule.
The alternative contrasting contender was formulated by the Federal Circuit in
the 1991 case, Hendler v. United States.83 The Federal Circuit's holding in
Hendler regarding the durational definition of temporary physical takings is
almost diametrically opposed to the Preseault 2 holding.
IV. HENDLER
Hendler is an environmental monitoring case. 4 It arose when the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") discovered a toxic waste site which
endangered the surrounding water supply. As part of its action plan, the EPA
determined that a series of sampling wells was required to monitor the toxic
levels in the ground water. The plan required that some of the wells be drilled on
Hendler's land. When the EPA requested Hendler's approval, he refused. The
EPA within its authorized powers entered the property and drilled the wells
without approval.8" Hendler entered a takings claim before the Federal Court of
Claims. That court denied Hendler's motion for summary judgment, ruling that
a trial would be necessary to determine the nature of the EPA action and the
EPA's "intentions." 6 The court apparently intended to apply the Penn Central
test to the specific facts of the case. Eventually, the Federal Court of Claims
dismissed Hendler's claim on a procedural issue. 7 Hendler appealed to the
Federal Circuit citing as error both the dismissal and the earlier denial of
summary judgment on the takings claim.88
The Federal Circuit reversed the Federal Court of Claims and directed that
summary judgment be granted to Hendler on his takings claim. The key holding
of the Federal Circuit addresses the EPA's argument that its intrusion, invasion,
or deprivation was only temporary. Judge Plager, writing for a unanimous panel,
expressed a very different definition of "temporary physical taking" than the
Preseault court. Plager first quoted a passage from the Supreme Court's Loretto
opinion:
A physical occupation of private property by the government which is
adjudged to be of a permanent nature is a taking, and that is true without
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner .... "[W]hen the physical intrusion
reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred. in such a case, 'the character of the government action' not only is
83. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
84. See William E. Remphrey, Jr., Hendler v. United States: Preserving Private Property
Rights in the Face of Environmental Regulation, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 465 (1993).
85. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
86. Id. at 1370.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1367.
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an important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also
is determinative."' 9
Then Plager explained why the passage from Loretto applied in Hendler:
In [the physical takings] context, "permanent" does not mean forever, or
anything like it. A taking can be for a limited term.., what is "taken" is, in
the language of real property law, an estate for years, that is, a term of finite
duration as distinct from the infinite term of an estate in fee simple absolute.
If the term temporary has any real world reference in takings jurisprudence,
it logically refers to those governmental activities which involve an
occupancy that is transient and relatively inconsequential, and thus properly
can be viewed as no more than a common law trespass .... 90
Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to be applying the precedent laid down in the
War Department seizure cases and in Pewee Coal9 that a physical deprivation
of a finite duration is treated as permanent. Unfortunately, the opinion does not
take the opportunity to reconcile this result with the physical invasion dicta of
Loretto.
Clearly, this position of the Federal Circuit is at wide variance with the Federal
Court of Claims position in Preseault 2 that a thirty year occupation is
temporary. Furthermore, the language of Hendler indicates that the two courts
would split on deprivations of almost any shorter duration. For instance, it
appears to be a near certainty that Preseault 2 would have been decided
differently using the Hendler rule. The physical occupation of the easement for
thirty years (or even the initial lease term of five years) would not have met the
Hendler court's very narrow definition of temporary as no more than a common
law trespass. The Preseaults' deprivation would, probably, have been ruled a per
se taking. Likewise, Hendler would almost certainly have been decided
differently under the Preseault 2 rule. Hendler does not state the length of time
the EPA intended to continue its activities on the Hendler property, but any finite
number of years would appear to qualify as temporary. As a temporary
deprivation, the taking determination would employ the Penn Central test, where
the EPA would have had a good chance of success on grounds that their action
provided significant benefit to the public including Hendler himself, that the
action inflicted no economic injury, and that Hendler retained as a residual
substantially all of the economic benefit of his property.
As this comparison of the outcomes of Preseault 2 and Hendler reveals, the
two rules defining temporary physical takings cannot both prevail. The Federal
Circuit and, perhaps ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to select one of the
rules (or announce a wholly different rule) to restore consistency. The combined
Preseault III opinions strongly suggest that the ultimate position on temporary
89. IR at 1375-76 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), in which Justice Marshall referred to the "character of the government action," one of
the three factors in the regulatory takings test contained in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 488 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)).
90. Id. at 1376-77.
91. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
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physical takings remains a matter in contention among the judges of the Federal
Circuit. One indicator of this situation is related to the fact that both Hendler and
Preseault I1 were authored by Judge Plager. It is difficult to explain why, after
writing so explicitly on temporary physical takings in Hendler, he should totally
ignore the issue in Preseault II1, especially when the temporary characterization
was central to the lower court's holding in Preseault 2.92 One possible
explanation is that the issue of temporary physical takings is contentious and
unsettled among the judges of the Federal Circuit. This theory is supported by the
very long delay from the ordering of en banc consideration (November 1995) to
the announcement of a decision (November 1996), and also by the lack of a
majority opinion. In any event, it seems that precise rules for adjudicating
temporary physical takings claims must await an ultimate ruling of the United
States Supreme Court extending and explaining (or rejecting) the dicta of
Loretto.93
The Court would seem to have a choice between two generic rules for
adjudicating temporary physical takings claims. The rule of Preseault 2 would
hold that any deprivation which is clearly finite is a temporary deprivation
subject to the Penn Central balancing test in any takings claim. The rule of
Hendler would hold that any physical deprivation, even if finite and very brief
in duration, is a per se compensable taking. Under the rule of Hendler, the only
deprivations or intrusions which would be considered temporary are those which
are virtually insignificant.
V. THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE PRESEAULT AND HENDLER RULES
In determining which of the two rules will prevail, the courts should examine
precedent but should also consider which rule better satisfies the public's need
for protection of individual rights and protection of their health, safety, and
welfare.
A. Analysis of Prior Judicial Precedent
An examination of cited precedents suggests that the Preseault 2 court's very
broad definition of "temporary" stands in contradiction of Supreme Court
holdings. However, the Hendler definition is far narrower than any of these
existing precedents require.
The Preseault 2 court draws solely on the Loretto opinion, which devotes
several pages to defining and comparing permanent physical occupations (which
are per se takings) and temporary physical invasions (which are subject to Penn
Central balancing analysis). However, the Federal Court of Claims seems to
ignore the occupation-invasion comparison and instead relies entirely on a
footnote appearing later in Loretto to support its rule:
The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation
distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude. Not every
92. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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physical invasion is a taking. As Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,94
Kaiser Aetna v. United States95 and the intermittent flooding cases reveal,
such temporary limitations are subject to a more complex balancing process
to determine whether they are a taking. The rationale is evident; they do not
absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude others from,
his property.96
This excerpt from Loretto appears at first examination to provide very solid
support for the Preseault decision. However, that support relies on acceptance
of the term "temporary" to mean any deprivation of finite duration. An
examination of existing precedent weakens this support to a considerable degree.
The most serious weakness is that Loretto recognizes Pewee Coal as
instructive in the very same section in which the quoted footnote occurs.9 7 Pewee
Coal is not addressed on the matter of distinguishing between temporary and
permanent. However, its mention indicates that the Court was aware of it,
considered it on point and felt no necessity to overrule it. In Pewee Coal, the
Court had treated the five-and-one-half month federal seizure of a coal mine as
a per se taking.9" It is difficult to believe that the Court would have changed an
entire class of takings claims from the per se branch to the balancing branch
without noting its departure from prior precedent established in a case it cited as
applicable law.
On the other hand, it is very reasonable to read the entire footnote in a context
consistent with Hendler-that only the briefest of deprivations are temporary and
subject to balancing, leaving deprivations of months and years in the permanent
category.
The references in the footnote to Pruneyard and Kaiser Aetna are not helpful
in resolving the definition issue. In both of these cases, duration of deprivation
was perpetual and not an issue. In Pruneyard, a shopping center owner was
forced by California law to admit to his premises any and all persons soliciting
petition signatures. The claimed deprivation (of the right to exclude) was
presumably infinite in duration since it derived from the California Constitution.
The Court engaged in balancing using the Penn Central test and found no taking,
without providing an explanation for rejecting per se analysis. 9 In Kaiser Aetna,
the federal government forced a developer to admit the public to a previously
private lagoon because its improvements had made the lagoon a navigable water
of the United States. Again the forced deprivation was infinite in duration but the
Court still went through the Penn Central test, this time finding a taking. " Both
of these cases appear to represent permanent physical takings to which the
balancing test has been applied. At least one commentator has described
Pruneyard and Kaiser Aetna as applications of an ad hoc approach to physical
94. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
95. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
96. Preseault 2, 27 Fed. Cl. at 95 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982)) (citations omitted).
97. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 431.
98. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
99. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980).
100. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-80 (1979).
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takings, which was repudiated by the Court in Loretto's ultimate holding.' ' If
these two cases have any bearing on Preseault, it cannot be that duration
influences the takings test.
The intermittent flooding cases referred to in the footnote are similarly
unsupportive of the Preseault 2 holding. The cited flooding cases 0 2 are a line of
five decisions beginning in 1903 and culminating in 1950, which refined the
Pumpelly holding for situations in which the flooding was not perpetual or not
constant. Representative of these cases is the 1924 opinion in Sanguinetti v.
United States.0 3 In Sanguinetti, the federal government had constructed a dam
which caused occasional flooding of Sanguinetti's farm in most years. The Court
found that there was no taking because the land was not permanently flooded nor
was it flooded for such a length of time in any year as to prevent its use as
agricultural land. 4 The Court stated its rule as follows:
[I]n order to create an enforceable liability against the government, it is at
least necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and
constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an
appropriation of and not merely an injury to the property.... Appellant was
not ousted, nor was his customary use of the land prevented, unless for short
periods of time."5
Although this rule requires permanence to support a taking, it is not clear how
much permanence is required. As the quoted passage suggests permanence may
not mean forever. In the intermittent flooding cases where a taking was not
found, the flooding was occasional, of brief duration, and did not significantly
interfere with the prior use of the land. The overall relevance of these cases to
the Preseault 2 ruling is not totally clear, but it is difficult to find support here
for expanding the scope of temporary physical takings to periods of months or
years especially when the effect is more than a mere injury to property, and
especially in view of the precedents of the War Department seizure cases and
Pewee Coal.
In contrast to the Preseault rule, the Hendler rule appears to be grounded more
firmly on precedent but its definition of "temporary" is far narrower and more
pro-property owner than any cited precedent. The Hendler definition does not
violate any precedent but it is more extreme than any prior opinion requires.
The Hendler court relies primarily on the War Department seizure cases
described in Part IV, above. These cases are very similar to Pewee Coal and
seem to confirm that an occupation can be legally permanent with a duration of
as little as twelve months (the shortest duration of the cited cases). The Pewee
Coal precedent would support per se treatment for deprivations as short as five
and one half months. The court however cites no precedent for its formulation
101. TRIBE, supra note I, at 599.
102. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); Sanguinetti v. United
States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Bedford v. United
States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
103. 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
104. Id. at 147.
105. Id. at 149.
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of temporary as "transient and relatively inconsequential, and thus ... no more
than a common law trespass."' 6 Here the court appears to be on new ground.
Based purely on precedent, the federal courts would seem to be compelled
eventually to reject the rule announced in Preseault 2 and to apply per se analysis
to all physical deprivations except those which are briefer than some arbitrary
interval. In selecting the length of this defining interval, the courts may well wish
to consider what is best from the viewpoint of public policy.
B. Public Policy Considerations
It is apparent that the Hendler rule is much more consistent with the traditional
values of protection of private property than the Preseault 2 rule. It puts
government on notice that any temporary physical deprivation, except the most
minimal and momentary, will work a per se taking. As noted in Part III above, the
Preseault 2 rule could be a temptation to government to circumvent the Takings
Clause under the pretense of temporary action.0 7 Indeed, in 1993, the federal
government employed the temporary physical taking argument in defending a
taking claim in a case where it had seized a warehouse and its contents and had
then extended access to a third party for a period of nine months.' The Federal
Circuit did not accept that argument and instead found a permanent taking, citing
the rule of Hendler. °9
However, the desirability of the Preseault 2 rule should not be dismissed out
of hand. It may well be that while the law of temporary physical takings is still
unsettled, the common good will be better served by settling it under the
regulatory branch and the Penn Central test.
The facts of Hendler suggest a strong public policy justification for something
like the Preseault 2 rule. The government's action to monitor ground water in
order to protect the public does not seem to be the sort of evil that the Takings
Clause was written to prevent. And indeed, it is difficult in a case like Hendler
to justify a rule which requires courts to ignore the benefits of the water quality
monitoring (including benefits to the complaining owner) and to ignore the
insignificance of the economic impact.
Furthermore, we should expect Hendler-type situations to become more
common as our understanding of environmental problems develops. The growing
appreciation that endangered ecosystems respect no property boundaries may
lead to more needs for government to enter land temporarily to monitor, inspect,
and remediate."'
106. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
107. See supra note 73-76 and accompanying text.
108. Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
109. Id. at 1582-83.
110. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Constitutional Dimensions ofProperty: A Debate, 26 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 23,32-33 (1992):
The ecological truism that everything is connected to everything else may be the
most profound challenge ever presented to established notions of property....
The real difficulty is that modem ecological theory has eroded the notion of a
bounded domain, often almost to the vanishing point... Many things that a short
time ago were thought entirely the business of a landowner within the confines
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In many ways, the need to have physical access to the environment in the 1980s
and 1990s is analogous to government's need to regulate land use beginning in
the early twentieth century. Just as the balancing test eventually met the need to
permit judicial flexibility in dealing with regulatory deprivation, the same test
may be the appropriate way to deal today with temporary physical deprivation.
If on the other hand, Hendler stands, then we can expect reaction to
environmental threats to be suppressed by the cost of compensation.
Based on this limited assessment of the two rules, it appears that existing
precedent more strongly supports the Hendler rule but a further examination of
public policy considerations suggests that the courts should give careful
consideration to the Preseault 2 rule as a beneficial "next step" in the
development of takings jurisprudence.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE DUAL STRUCTURE
While the court of appeals and, perhaps the Supreme Court, weigh the
applicable precedents and the immediate public policy dimensions of Preseault,
they must also acknowledge that the case sharply illuminates the question of
retaining or abandoning the entire dual branch system of takings law. The final
Preseault decision offers an opportunity for a new beginning in this area. The
Preseault-Hendler collision appears to be unprecedented as the first opportunity
in which the courts were called upon to decide into which of the two branches a
potentially large proportion of future takings claims would fall. Rarely before
had the courts faced a legitimate opportunity to compare the merits of the two
takings branches in the context of an issue clearly before them. That opportunity
was presented here.
It is, of course, highly unlikely that the final ruling in a further appeal of
Preseault would announce a sweeping revision of takings law. It could, however,
serve as the beginning of a shift to a more consistent and uniform set of rules and
the eventual elimination of the dual structure. Support for the Hendler rule might
be seen by the nation at large as a harbinger of expansion of the per se rule even
into regulatory deprivation cases, while endorsement of the Preseault 2 rule
would similarly be seen as heralding the expansion of balancing into the physical
takings realm.
In selecting either of these two directions the courts should consider not only
existing precedents, and the historical roots of the Takings Clause, but also the
evolving role of property and property rights in American society. Contemporary
thought in this area covers a very wide spectrum, from those who see property
as an absolute and inviolable right, to those who see it as a malleable creation of
the state which can and should be changed from time to time as the conditions of
society evolve.
Typical of the first viewpoint, Professor Epstein takes an absolutist and
traditional position on takings, seeing little change since 1789 in the role of
private property. Epstein traces much of his argument to the Lockean liberal
of his or her own land are now revealed to be intimately interconnected with other
lands and with public resources that have never been thought to belong to the
owner of a given tract.
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views of James Madison. In fact, he bases much of his takings commentary on
the writings of Locke himself:
The supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property
without his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of
government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily
supposes and requires that the people should have property, without which
they must be supposed to lose that by entering into society, which was the
end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any man to
own.
111
Arguing Lockte's influence on the Framers of the Constitution, Epstein insists
that government deprivation is a taking whenever the same action by a private
citizen would be a taking. Using this test, he endorses Justice Holmes's decision
in Mahon (though he notes Holmes's later regret over limiting future
compensation only to cases in which regulation "goes too far")." 2 He then
quickly dismisses as incorrect the Court's rulings in Penn Central and
Pruneyard, where the Court found no taking. Epstein would have decided both
cases on absolute property right grounds. In addressing Pruneyard Epstein
writes:
The Rehnquist opinion reveals its intellectual weakness at every turn.
Nowhere does the Court offer a coherent account of the incidents of
ownership including exclusive possession. In private cases, no injunction
against entry is dependent upon a showing of actual damages. The entry itself
is the violation of the right.... It therefore follows that any demonstration
about negligible impairment of the [owner's] rights is wholly beside the point
as it would be in a private dispute.I"
It is quite significant that, in attacking Penn Central, Epstein necessarily
argues for the extension of per se analysis to regulatory takings claims. This
introduces a familiar problem: since almost every law and regulation deprives
someone of some previously available prerogative, there is no clear limit to
prevent paralyzing or impoverishing the government" 4 If a claimant need only
show a deprivation and that deprivation is per se a taking, then every regulatory
deprivation will require payment of compensation. While some devout
libertarians may desire such an extreme handicapping of government, most
Americans probably would reject an outcome this extreme.
However, even if some bright line limit could be found to limit the expansion
of the per se branch, there is considerable reason to believe that this branch is no
longer consistent with the modem evolution of the nature of property. Professor
Epstein is the intellectual heir of the liberal belief that property was an essential
barrier protecting the individual and his freedoms from the potential tyranny of
government. In 1789 and even in 1889, this concept may have held much truth.
Within his own farm, a citizen might make a living, produce sufficient resources
to feed and clothe his family and be beyond the reach of the state. No matter how
111. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 14 (1985) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 138 (1690)).
112. Id. at 63.
113. Id. at 65.
114. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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arbitrary and capricious government might become, it could not, without
violating the Takings Clause, confiscate this island of personal liberty unless it
paid the cost of procuring another. The modem viability of this traditional view
of property is very questionable.
One challenge to it comes from the concept of "The New Property," initially
conceived in 1964 by Professor Reich." 5 Reich's proposition is that land and
chattels are no longer the primary tools by which citizens insure their livelihood
and are no longer the focus of citizens' vulnerability to government tyranny. The
place of land and goods has been taken by the many entitlements and controls
which link people to the state. Citizens no longer rely on soil for their
livelihoods, but rather upon government indulgences such as welfare benefits,
unemployment insurance, Medicaid, government jobs, government contracts,
driver's licenses, business licenses, professional credentials, and building
permits, to name only a few examples.' 6 Reich argues persuasively that this
"New Property" has displaced the old property but must be protected for
precisely the same reason-to preserve the freedom of each individual. However,
this "New Property" is better protected by application of the Due Process Clause
than the Takings Clause. Indeed a line of cases resting on the Due Process Clause
has established that the elements of the "New Property" are indeed rights, not
privileges, and cannot be taken without benefit of a hearing in most cases." 7 It
might be argued persuasively that even Locke might redirect the focus of his
concerns away from physical property if he were presented with the modern
relationship between citizen and state.
Opposition to the extension of the per se branch seems then to be formidably
opposed both on pragmatic cost grounds and by the modern erosion of its
philosophical foundation. This erosion is furthered by those who argue that
classic concepts of property no longer work. These arguments hold that the
nature and role of property rights has evolved over the long life of the Republic
and has reached a point that the purposes of the Takings Clause are no longer
served by the judicial rules which seek to enforce it. This view is expressed by
Professor Sax in seeking to defend Penn Central. Not surprisingly, Sax begins
his defense with a distinctly different assumption (from Professor Epstein's) of
the role and purpose or private property rights. He sees property as a creation of
the state and society, whose primary purpose is to insure that resources will be
devoted to socially desirable uses through market forces."' However, when
society begins to recognize that the system no longer consistently produces
socially desirable results a change becomes necessary:
Put as bluntly as possible my thesis is this: We have endowed individuals and
enterprises with property because we assume that the private ownership
system will allocate and reallocate the property resource to socially desirable
uses. Any such allocational system will, of course, fail from time to time. But
115. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
116. Id.
117. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
118. Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Properly, 58 WASH. L. REv.
481, 484 (1983).
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when the system fails to allocate property to "correct" uses, we begin to lose
faith in the system itself. Just as older systems of property, like feudal
tenures, declined as they became nonfunctional, so our own system is
declining to the extent it is perceived as a functional failure. Since such
failures are becoming increasingly common, the property rights that lead to
such failures are increasingly ceasing to be recognized .... [I]n cases like
Penn Central and many other modem situations such as open space
preservation or coastal protection, there is widespread agreement that
nondevelopment is the correct result, and widespread recognition that
conventional bargaining.., is not bringing about that result." 9
Sax's conclusion is that owners do not actually possess property rights which
fail to serve society's intended goals and in such cases the right is not taken but
is simply not possessed in the first instance. 21 Using nuisance law as a paradigm,
he asserts that no owner has a property right to use his property in a manner
contrary to the common good. Sax's immediate goal is to justify the denial of
compensation in Penn Central, a regulatory takings case. But his arguments
strike as directly at the concept of per se analysis of physical takings. If property
rights serve to block or financially hamper toxic monitoring or even recreational
hiking trails, then those rights are arguably not present because they would fail
to allocate the land to its best socially acceptable use. It follows that this view of
property rights can be supported only where every claim is subjected to a
balancing test. Per se tests will not work because the per se ruling presumes the
validity of the right interfered with and never inquires into background facts
supporting its continued recognition.
Sax's view appears to be a modem descendent of the Jeffersonian civic
republican concept of property as a right granted by the state to individuals as a
tool for promoting common good. The civic republicans saw the direct effect of
ownership to be a stake in the community leading to dedicated involvement in
local democracy. Sax updates the model only to the extent that the common good
consists here of nearly optimal allocation of resources.
Should the courts, then, discard the dual structure and adopt one or the other
view? To date the Supreme Court has shown no indication of doing so. In Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 12 the Court kept the two branches distinct
but established a link between them and extended the per se rule to the extreme
case of total regulatory deprivation.
In the end, it appears that Epstein's may be the weaker argument based more
in political and legal history than in modem political and legal reality. The
proposition that land and other physical property serves as the protection of the
individual from the intrusion of the state has waned in validity with national
growth, urbanization, and the interdependence of persons with each other and
with the government. As Professor Reich has pointed out the "New Property" in
the sense of a fortress against the state is less land and goods and more bound up
in government entitlements and benefits. As such it is easier to see Locke's
concerns being satisfied by the Due Process Clause and by the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act than by the Takings Clause.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 486.
121. 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
1997] TAKINGS LA W 1207
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
Furthermore, as previously stated, the extension of per se analysis to regulation
eventually paralyzes government. Except for a small minority of devout
libertarians, that is simply not a result any conceivable Supreme Court could
embrace.
It is somewhat more likely that the Court could see its way to extend balancing
analysis to all takings claims. At first consideration, this seems not to be a
revolutionary departure from precedent. After all, takings law has evolved
repeatedly, if not continuously, throughout the nation's history. The Takings
Clause which originally addressed only eminent domain, was extended first to
physical occupation, and then to regulatory deprivation, with evolving tests
throughout the process. It is somewhat difficult, however, to characterize the
application of balancing to permanent physical deprivations as a logical
continuation this expansion of the scope of the Takings Clause. It is more a
retreat and revision than an expansion. This would be the first time in the
development of takings law that a step in development would favor government
over the individual. For this reason alone, the Court may be reluctant to take the
step.
In the end it would take something like Sax's arguments to make the logical
leap. What unifies the recognition of regulatory takings and the changing of the
test for physical takings is an acceptance by society and the courts that the nature
of the community has changed and the impact of property rights on the welfare
of the community has changed. From its support of zoning early in this century
down to its denial of Penn Central's takings claim, the Court has been willing to
forge new law to meet the evolving need. This time, however, the Court would
have to be prepared to turn its back on long standing precedents guarding
possession and the right to exclude.
At the same time, it is almost certainly not an acceptable long-term answer to
retain the dual structure. As Preseault 2 and Hendler illustrate, the system is
likely to produce cases at the boundaries which are fugitives from either branch,
which will confuse lower courts and produce conflicting decisions. The Court
needs to fashion a system which is logical, consistent, and judicially workable.
That system is almost certainly a balancing system fashioned on the Penn Central
model.
Changes in the law are better digested slowly. In the end the best action by the
Court may be to support the Federal Court of Claims' decision in Preseault 2
holding that all temporary takings of any duration fall under the Penn Central
rule. This may be an interim position for eventual expansion of balancing to all
takings claims.
CONCLUSION
It appears that takings law well deserves its frequent characterization as a
"muddle."'22 Its two branches-physical takings and regulatory takings-are
122. See Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND.
L. REV. 329 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); see also JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 430 (1991) ("The Supreme Court's decisions in 'taking' issues may
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governed by different rules which often produce results which are contradictory
and inconsistent.
Although the special category of temporary physical takings has received little
attention compared to the two main branches, it may become more prominent as
a result of the needs of government to enter land to monitor, inspect, and
remediate damage to the human environment. At present, two contradictory rules
for defining and resolving temporary physical takings claims have been
announced by different federal courts. One of these rules, the Hendler rule,
almost defines the category out of existence, and would result in virtually all
governmental physical deprivations being declared takings. The other rule, the
Preseault 2 rule, defines the category very broadly to include even physical
occupation for many (but a finite number of) years. Under this rule, courts would
be permitted to engage in balancing the public benefits and the private harm in
determining whether each deprivation is a taking.
The Hendler rule is better supported by prior judicial precedent and is more
consistent with traditional values of the sanctity of private property. However,
the Hendler rule may not best serve the public good. It could be expected to raise
the cost and thus reduce the amount of effort in environmental quality programs.
The Preseault 2 rule is not supported by most existing precedents and is largely
inconsistent with American traditions of protection of private property. However,
adoption of the Preseault 2 rule may be an appropriate "next step" in the
developmental progression of takings law from per se physical takings to a
balancing test for regulatory takings.
In deciding between the two rules, the courts should give full consideration not
only to precedent and immediate public policy concerns, but also to the evolving
nature of private property rights in American society, and to the need for logical
coherence in the structure of takings jurisprudence.
A full consideration of all these factors strongly supports the extension of
balancing rules to all finite duration physical takings claims, despite apparent
conflict with precedent.
properly be viewed as a 'crazy quilt pattern' of rulings.").
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